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Examining the practical side channel resilience of arx-boxes

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Examining the practical side channel resilience of arx-boxes. / Yan, Yan; Oswald, Elisabeth.

ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers 2019, CF 2019 - Proceedings: April 30 - May 2, 2019, Alghero, Sardinia, Italy . Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2019. p. 373-379.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Harvard

Yan, Y & Oswald, E 2019, Examining the practical side channel resilience of arx-boxes. in ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers 2019, CF 2019 - Proceedings: April 30 - May 2, 2019, Alghero, Sardinia, Italy . Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), pp. 373-379, 16th ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers, CF 2019, Alghero, Sardinia, Italy, 30/04/19. https://doi.org/10.1145/3310273.3323399

APA

Yan, Y., & Oswald, E. (2019). Examining the practical side channel resilience of arx-boxes. In ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers 2019, CF 2019 - Proceedings: April 30 - May 2, 2019, Alghero, Sardinia, Italy (pp. 373-379). Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). https://doi.org/10.1145/3310273.3323399

Vancouver

Yan Y, Oswald E. Examining the practical side channel resilience of arx-boxes. In ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers 2019, CF 2019 - Proceedings: April 30 - May 2, 2019, Alghero, Sardinia, Italy . Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 2019. p. 373-379 https://doi.org/10.1145/3310273.3323399

Author

Yan, Yan ; Oswald, Elisabeth. / Examining the practical side channel resilience of arx-boxes. ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers 2019, CF 2019 - Proceedings: April 30 - May 2, 2019, Alghero, Sardinia, Italy . Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2019. pp. 373-379

Bibtex

@inproceedings{df76a153a7644db7acb371914a5bb691,
title = "Examining the practical side channel resilience of arx-boxes",
abstract = "Implementations of ARX ciphers are hoped to have some intrinsic side channel resilience owing to the specific choice of cipher components: Modular addition (A), rotation (R) and exclusive-or (X). Previous work has contributed to this understanding by developing theory regarding the side channel resilience of components (pioneered by the early works of Prouff) as well as some more recent practical investigations by Biryukov et al. that focused on lightweight cipher constructions. We add to this work by specifically studying ARX-boxes both mathematically as well as practically. Our results show that previous works' reliance on the simplistic assumption that intermediates independently leak (their Hamming weight) has led to the incorrect conclusion that the modular addition is necessarily the best target and that ARX constructions are therefore harder to attack in practice: We show that on an ARM M0, the best practical target is the exclusive or and attacks succeed with only tens of traces.",
keywords = "ARX, Correlation Attack, Side Channel",
author = "Yan Yan and Elisabeth Oswald",
year = "2019",
month = "4",
day = "30",
doi = "10.1145/3310273.3323399",
language = "English",
pages = "373--379",
booktitle = "ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers 2019, CF 2019 - Proceedings",
publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)",
address = "United States",

}

RIS - suitable for import to EndNote

TY - GEN

T1 - Examining the practical side channel resilience of arx-boxes

AU - Yan, Yan

AU - Oswald, Elisabeth

PY - 2019/4/30

Y1 - 2019/4/30

N2 - Implementations of ARX ciphers are hoped to have some intrinsic side channel resilience owing to the specific choice of cipher components: Modular addition (A), rotation (R) and exclusive-or (X). Previous work has contributed to this understanding by developing theory regarding the side channel resilience of components (pioneered by the early works of Prouff) as well as some more recent practical investigations by Biryukov et al. that focused on lightweight cipher constructions. We add to this work by specifically studying ARX-boxes both mathematically as well as practically. Our results show that previous works' reliance on the simplistic assumption that intermediates independently leak (their Hamming weight) has led to the incorrect conclusion that the modular addition is necessarily the best target and that ARX constructions are therefore harder to attack in practice: We show that on an ARM M0, the best practical target is the exclusive or and attacks succeed with only tens of traces.

AB - Implementations of ARX ciphers are hoped to have some intrinsic side channel resilience owing to the specific choice of cipher components: Modular addition (A), rotation (R) and exclusive-or (X). Previous work has contributed to this understanding by developing theory regarding the side channel resilience of components (pioneered by the early works of Prouff) as well as some more recent practical investigations by Biryukov et al. that focused on lightweight cipher constructions. We add to this work by specifically studying ARX-boxes both mathematically as well as practically. Our results show that previous works' reliance on the simplistic assumption that intermediates independently leak (their Hamming weight) has led to the incorrect conclusion that the modular addition is necessarily the best target and that ARX constructions are therefore harder to attack in practice: We show that on an ARM M0, the best practical target is the exclusive or and attacks succeed with only tens of traces.

KW - ARX

KW - Correlation Attack

KW - Side Channel

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85066049155&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1145/3310273.3323399

DO - 10.1145/3310273.3323399

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85066049155

SP - 373

EP - 379

BT - ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers 2019, CF 2019 - Proceedings

PB - Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)

ER -