Financial reporting quality effects of imposing (gender) quotas on boards of directors

Juan Manuel M Garcia Lara*, José S. Penalva, Mariano Scapin

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)
70 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We analyze whether the passage of a Norwegian law requiring a minimum of a 40 percent of women on the boards of public firms affected financial reporting quality. Our results are consistent with a decrease in financial reporting quality for the firms that were most affected by the passage of the law, and with the effects being relatively short-lived. We also find evidence that board members characteristics, beyond gender, changed due to this law. These changes can partially explain our findings. Overall, our results show that mandating large changes to board composition over a relatively small period of time negatively affects financial reporting.
Original languageEnglish
Article number106921
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Accounting and Public Policy
Volume41
Issue number2
Early online date7 Dec 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 9 Mar 2022

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We are grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions from Manuel Bagüés, Jin Chen, Ted Christensen, Mark Clatworthy, Amy Dittmar, Joachim Gassen, Belén Gill de Albornoz, Giovanna Michelon, Gaizka Ormazabal, Dan Segal, Laurence van Lent, Franco Wong and seminar participants at Aalto University, City University of London—Cass Business School, Comisión Andina de Fomento (CAF), IESEG School of Management, London School of Economics, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, University of Bristol, Bocconi University, University of Miami, University of Michigan, WHU School of Management, University of Essex, University of Mannheim, Universitat Jaume I de Castelló, Durham University, the EAA Doctoral Colloquium in Accounting; the Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association; the IX International Accounting Symposium (Madrid); the Annual Meeting of the American Accounting Association; the 9th Workshop on European Financial Reporting (Valencia); 2nd International Accounting Conference (Miami); XI Workshop on Empirical Accounting Research (Córdoba) and several internal seminars at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. We are also grateful to Genaro Sucarrat for providing data regarding listing dates of Norwegian public firms. The authors acknowledge financial assistance from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competition [J.M. Garcia Lara and M. Scapin PID2019-111143GB-C32; ECO2016-77579 and ECO2013-48328-C3-3-P; J. Penalva: PID2019-104649RB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, FEDER UNC315-EE-3636], the Comunidad de Madrid [S2015/HUM-3353 (EARLYFIN-CM), and Programa Excelencia para el Profesorado Universitario, convenio con Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, V Plan Regional de Investigación Científica e Innovación Tecnológica, EPUC3M12] and from Fundación Ramón Areces.

Funding Information:
We are grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions from Manuel Bagüés, Jin Chen, Ted Christensen, Mark Clatworthy, Amy Dittmar, Joachim Gassen, Belén Gill de Albornoz, Giovanna Michelon, Gaizka Ormazabal, Dan Segal, Laurence van Lent, Franco Wong and seminar participants at Aalto University, City University of London—Cass Business School, Comisión Andina de Fomento (CAF), IESEG School of Management, London School of Economics, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, University of Bristol, Bocconi University, University of Miami, University of Michigan, WHU School of Management, University of Essex, University of Mannheim, Universitat Jaume I de Castelló, Durham University, the EAA Doctoral Colloquium in Accounting; the Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association; the IX International Accounting Symposium (Madrid); the Annual Meeting of the American Accounting Association; the 9th Workshop on European Financial Reporting (Valencia); 2nd International Accounting Conference (Miami); XI Workshop on Empirical Accounting Research (Córdoba) and several internal seminars at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. We are also grateful to Genaro Sucarrat for providing data regarding listing dates of Norwegian public firms. The authors acknowledge financial assistance from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competition [J.M. Garcia Lara and M. Scapin PID2019-111143GB-C32; ECO2016-77579 and ECO2013-48328-C3-3-P; J. Penalva: PID2019-104649RB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, FEDER UNC315-EE-3636], the Comunidad de Madrid [S2015/HUM-3353 (EARLYFIN-CM), and Programa Excelencia para el Profesorado Universitario, convenio con Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, V Plan Regional de Investigación Científica e Innovación Tecnológica, EPUC3M12] and from Fundación Ramón Areces.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier Inc.

Keywords

  • quotas
  • mandated changes on boards of directors
  • monitoring
  • financial reporting quality

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