Game-Theoretic Resource Allocation with Real-Time Probabilistic Surveillance Information

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Abstract

Game-theoretic security resource allocation problems have generated significant interest in the area of designing and developing security systems. These approaches traditionally utilize the Stackelberg game model for security resource scheduling in order to improve the protection of critical assets. The basic assumption in Stackelberg games is that a defender will act first, then an attacker will choose their best response after observing the defender’s strategy commitment (e.g., protecting a specific asset). Thus, it requires an attacker’s full or partial observation of a defender’s strategy. This assumption is unrealistic in real-time threat recognition and prevention. In this paper, we propose a new solution concept (i.e., a method to predict how a game will be played) for deriving the defender’s optimal strategy based on the principle of acceptable costs of minimax regret. Moreover, we demonstrate the advantages of this solution concept by analyzing its properties.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSymbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Subtitle of host publication13th European Conference, ECSQARU 2015, Compiègne, France, July 15-17, 2015. Proceedings
EditorsSebastien Destercke, Thierry Denoeux
PublisherSpringer
Pages151-161
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)9783319208077
ISBN (Print)9783319208060
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 12 Jul 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer
Volume9161
ISSN (Print)0302-9743

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