Going Forward by Staying Put: The Political Economy of Stabilizing Trade Agreements and Initiatives

Increasingly, States are entering into trade agreements or negotiating initiatives which sustain Parties’ existing market access commitments and ‘behind-the-border’ regulatory barriers to trade. This article examines the political economy of such stabilizing trade agreements or initiatives (STAIs). First, it provides a functional account of what STAIs are as legal instruments and maps the formal diversity of such arrangements. Second, the article addresses how they may meaningfully support the welfare-enhancement and international security protection objectives typically pursued by international trade agreements. Finally, it shows how, unlike liberalizing trade agreements, STAIs rely on three core governance functions: i) stabilize economic actor expectations when liberalization commitments between trade partners are rebalanced, ii) facilitate regulatory and political cooperation between trade partners, and iii) create a first mover’s advantage for (coalitions of) trade partners in setting new rules of economic governance.