Abstract
The indistinguishability of two pieces of data (or two lists of
pieces of data) can be represented formally in terms of a relation
called static equivalence. Static equivalence depends on an
underlying equational theory. The choice of an inappropriate
equational theory can lead to overly pessimistic or overly
optimistic notions of indistinguishability, and in turn to security
criteria that require protection against impossible attacks
or---worse yet---that ignore feasible ones. In this paper, we
define and justify an equational theory for standard, fundamental
cryptographic operations. This equational theory yields a notion of
static equivalence that implies computational
indistinguishability. Static equivalence remains liberal enough for
use in applications.
In particular, we develop and analyze a principled formal account of
guessing attacks in terms of static equivalence.
Translated title of the contribution | Guessing Attacks and the Computational Soundness of Static Equivalence |
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Original language | English |
Title of host publication | Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures - FOSSACS 2006 |
Publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
Pages | 398-412 |
Volume | 3921 |
Publication status | Published - 2006 |
Bibliographical note
Other page information: -Conference Proceedings/Title of Journal: Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures -- FOSSACS'06
Other identifier: 2000655