Abstract
In his practical philosophy, Kant aims to systematize and ground a conception of morality that every human being already in some form is supposedly committed to in virtue of her common human reason. While Kantians especially in the last few years have explicitly acknowledged the central role of common human reason for a correct understanding of Kant’s ethics, there has been very little detailed critical discussion of the very notion of a common human reason as Kant envisages it. Sticker critically discusses in what ways Kant is committed to the notion that there are certain rational insights and rational capacities that all humans share, and thus investigates critically how Kant thinks moral normativity appears to the common human being, the rational agent who did not enjoy special education or philosophical training.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Kant on Morality, Humanity, and Legality |
| Subtitle of host publication | Practical Dimensions of Normativity |
| Editors | Ansgar Lyssy, Christopher Yeomans |
| Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan |
| Chapter | 9 |
| Pages | 167-187 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9783030540500 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9783030540494, 9783030540524 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 30 Oct 2020 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information: Work on this article was supported by a 2-year research fellowship from the Irish Research Council (GOIPD/2016/244). Moreover, this research was supported by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation grant no. 075-15-2019-1929, project “Kantian Rationality and Its Impact in Contemporary Science, Technology, and Social Institutions”, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (IKBFU), Kaliningrad.Publisher Copyright: © 2021 The Author(s)