Abstract
This study examines the levels of executive excess compensation (EEC) that stimulate the quality and efficiency of enterprise technology innovation (ETI). Using a behavioral agency perspective, we investigate how companies achieve superior ETI by providing sufficient incentives to motivate executives to perform to the best of their abilities. We use a panel threshold model based on a sample of Chinese-listed biopharmaceutical companies and find that: (1) providing an EEC between 0.0592 and 0.1907 significantly affects the promotion of ETI quality; (2) regarding ETI efficiency, executives generally do not receive the compensation that they deserve; and (3) the existing EEC has a weak negative impact on ETI efficiency, gradually disappearing as compensation increases. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that restricting EEC to the eastern area and strengthening the supervision of EEC in state-owned enterprises are effective measures for stimulating ETI. We advance the literature by providing guidance on compensation plans to companies in different regions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 114683 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Journal of Business Research |
| Volume | 179 |
| Early online date | 29 Apr 2024 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2024 The Author(s)
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