Abstract
We analyse Kreisel’s notion of human-effective computability. Like Kreisel, we relate this notion to a concept of informal provability, but we disagree with Kreisel about the precise way in which this is best done. The resulting two different ways of analysing human-effective computability give rise to two different variants of Church’s thesis. These are both investigated by relating them to transfinite progressions of formal theories in the sense of Feferman.
Original language | English |
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Article number | nky011 |
Pages (from-to) | 61-87 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | Philosophia Mathematica |
Volume | 27 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 24 Jun 2018 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 15 Feb 2019 |