Abstract
Hájek (Erkenntnis 70(2):211–235, 2009) argues that probabilities cannot be the limits of relative frequencies in counterfactual infinite sequences. I argue for a different understanding of these limits, drawing on Norton’s (Philos Sci 79(2):207–232, 2012) distinction between approximations (inexact descriptions of a target) and idealizations (separate models that bear analogies to the target). Then, I adapt Hájek’s arguments to this new context. These arguments provide excellent reasons not to use hypothetical frequencies as idealizations, but no reason not to use them as approximations.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1295–1325 |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Journal | Erkenntnis |
| Volume | 89 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 13 Jul 2022 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© This is a U.S. Government work and not under copyright protection in the US; foreign copyright protection may apply 2022.
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