Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency

Simon Burgess; Carol Propper; Marisa Ratto; Emma Tominey

doi:10.1111/ecoj.12422

Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency

Simon Burgess, Carol Propper, Marisa Ratto, Emma Tominey^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

35 Citations (Scopus)

221 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We study the impact of team-based performance pay in a major UK government agency, the public employment service. The scheme covered quantity and quality targets, measured with varying degrees of precision. We use unique data from the agency's performance management system and personnel records, linked to local labour market data. We show that on average the scheme had no significant effect but had a substantial positive effect in small teams, fitting an explanation combining free riding and peer monitoring. The impact was greater on better-measured quantity outcomes than quality outcomes. The scheme was very cost effective in small offices.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	F117–F141
Number of pages	25
Journal	Economic Journal
Volume	127
Issue number	605
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12422
Publication status	Published - 24 Oct 2017

Research Groups and Themes

ECON Applied Economics

Keywords

Incentives
Public Sector
Teams
Performance
Personnel Economics

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10.1111/ecoj.12422

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KW - Performance

KW - Personnel Economics

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Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency

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Professor Simon M Burgess

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Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency

Abstract

Research Groups and Themes

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Professor Simon M Burgess

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