Incommensurability Naturalized

Alexander Bird

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingOther chapter contribution

Abstract

In this paper I argue that we can understand incommensurability in a naturalistic, psychological manner. Cognitive habits can be acquired and so differ between individuals. Drawing on psychological work concerning analogical thinking and thinking with schemata, I argue that incommensurability arises between individuals with different cognitive habits and between groups with different shared cognitive habits.
Original languageUndefined/Unknown
Title of host publicationRethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison
EditorsLéna Soler, Howard Sankey, Paul Hoyningen-Huene
Place of PublicationDordrecht
PublisherSpinger Link
Pages21-39
Number of pages19
Volume255
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Publication series

NameBoston Studies in the Philosophy of Science
PublisherSpinger

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