Increasing the Secrecy Gap in Quasi-Static Rayleigh Channels with Secret Splitting

Chrysa Paschou*, Oliver T Johnson, Angela Doufexi, Ziming Zhu, Woon Hau Chin

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

1 Citation (Scopus)
141 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

To secure transmissions in the presence of a passive eavesdropper whose Channel State Information (CSI) is unknown, classical Physical Layer Security (PLS) uses Artificial Noise (AN) in order to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel. This paper suggests an alternative way of achieving confidentiality which is based on Base Station (BS) cooperation on the downlink as supported in 3GPP LTE-advanced and future 5G networks. Each BS sends a sequence to the legitimate receiver who is able to reconstruct the information message by XoRing the received sequences. As long as the eavesdropper(s) is not at the same location as the legitimate receiver, there is a likelihood that one of the links will not be of high quality and, as such, she will not be able to acquire all sequences required for decoding the message. The proposed scheme has low complexity at the receiver and can be used in systems with finite-alphabet input, where by most Artificial-Noise (AN) based schemes are ineffective.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2020 IEEE Globecom Workshops, GC Wkshps 2020 - Proceedings
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-7281-7307-8
ISBN (Print)978-1-7281-7308-5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2021

Publication series

NameIEEE Globecom Workshops
PublisherIEEE
ISSN (Print)2166-0069
ISSN (Electronic)2166-0077

Keywords

  • physical layer security
  • wiretap coding
  • secrecy gap
  • base-station cooperation
  • transmit beamforming

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