Abstract
When one allows truth to be indeterminate, “fixed point” interpretations can be found even when the language includes sentences such as the liar paradox. In this chapter this kind of account is applied to rational credences, to find non-undermining indeterminate epistemic states even in certain situations which have been discussed as challenges for rationality. In the process of doing this, a deeper understanding of how the supervaluational account of truth works is obtained, especially when one focuses on sets of precisifications.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Modes of Truth |
| Subtitle of host publication | The Unified Approach to Truth, Modality, and Paradox |
| Publisher | Routledge |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2021 |
Research Groups and Themes
- Centre for Science and Philosophy
- FSB