Abstract
When a government makes many different policy decisions, lobbying can be viewed as a contest between the government and many different special interest groups. The government fights lobbying by interest groups with its own political capital. In this world, we find that a government wants to ‘sell protection’ – give favourable treatment in exchange for contributions – to certain interest groups. It does this in order to build its own ‘war chest’ of political capital, which improves its position in fights with other interest groups. And it does so until it wins all remaining contests with certainty. This stands in contrast to existing models that often view lobbying as driven by information or agency problems.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 105068 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
Volume | 231 |
Early online date | 28 Jan 2024 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2024 The Author(s)
Research Groups and Themes
- ECON Microeconomic Theory