Inside the West Wing: Lobbying as a contest

Alastair Langtry*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

Abstract

When a government makes many different policy decisions, lobbying can be viewed as a contest between the government and many different special interest groups. The government fights lobbying by interest groups with its own political capital. In this world, we find that a government wants to ‘sell protection’ – give favourable treatment in exchange for contributions – to certain interest groups. It does this in order to build its own ‘war chest’ of political capital, which improves its position in fights with other interest groups. And it does so until it wins all remaining contests with certainty. This stands in contrast to existing models that often view lobbying as driven by information or agency problems.
Original languageEnglish
Article number105068
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume231
Early online date28 Jan 2024
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 The Author(s)

Research Groups and Themes

  • ECON Microeconomic Theory

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