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Intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation in repeated interactions

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation in repeated interactions. / Proto, Eugenio; Rustichini, Aldo; Sofianos, Andis.

In: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 127, No. 3, 01.06.2019, p. 1351-1390.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Proto, E, Rustichini, A & Sofianos, A 2019, 'Intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation in repeated interactions', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 127, no. 3, pp. 1351-1390. https://doi.org/10.1086/701355

APA

Proto, E., Rustichini, A., & Sofianos, A. (2019). Intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation in repeated interactions. Journal of Political Economy, 127(3), 1351-1390. https://doi.org/10.1086/701355

Vancouver

Proto E, Rustichini A, Sofianos A. Intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation in repeated interactions. Journal of Political Economy. 2019 Jun 1;127(3):1351-1390. https://doi.org/10.1086/701355

Author

Proto, Eugenio ; Rustichini, Aldo ; Sofianos, Andis. / Intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation in repeated interactions. In: Journal of Political Economy. 2019 ; Vol. 127, No. 3. pp. 1351-1390.

Bibtex

@article{21e01ddb5438495f8bf20ee3f4907952,
title = "Intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation in repeated interactions",
abstract = "We study how intelligence and personality affect the outcomes of groups, focusing on repeated interactions that provide the opportunity for profitable cooperation. Our experimental method creates two groups of subjects who have different levels of certain traits, such as higher or lower levels of Intelligence, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness, but who are very similar otherwise. Intelligence has a large and positive long-run effect on cooperative behavior. The effect is strong when at the equilibrium of the repeated game there is a trade-off be-tweenshort-rungains andlong-runlosses. Conscientiousness andAgree-ableness have a natural, significant but transitory effect on cooperation rates.",
author = "Eugenio Proto and Aldo Rustichini and Andis Sofianos",
year = "2019",
month = "6",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1086/701355",
language = "English",
volume = "127",
pages = "1351--1390",
journal = "Journal of Political Economy",
issn = "0022-3808",
publisher = "University of Chicago",
number = "3",

}

RIS - suitable for import to EndNote

TY - JOUR

T1 - Intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation in repeated interactions

AU - Proto, Eugenio

AU - Rustichini, Aldo

AU - Sofianos, Andis

PY - 2019/6/1

Y1 - 2019/6/1

N2 - We study how intelligence and personality affect the outcomes of groups, focusing on repeated interactions that provide the opportunity for profitable cooperation. Our experimental method creates two groups of subjects who have different levels of certain traits, such as higher or lower levels of Intelligence, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness, but who are very similar otherwise. Intelligence has a large and positive long-run effect on cooperative behavior. The effect is strong when at the equilibrium of the repeated game there is a trade-off be-tweenshort-rungains andlong-runlosses. Conscientiousness andAgree-ableness have a natural, significant but transitory effect on cooperation rates.

AB - We study how intelligence and personality affect the outcomes of groups, focusing on repeated interactions that provide the opportunity for profitable cooperation. Our experimental method creates two groups of subjects who have different levels of certain traits, such as higher or lower levels of Intelligence, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness, but who are very similar otherwise. Intelligence has a large and positive long-run effect on cooperative behavior. The effect is strong when at the equilibrium of the repeated game there is a trade-off be-tweenshort-rungains andlong-runlosses. Conscientiousness andAgree-ableness have a natural, significant but transitory effect on cooperation rates.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85065759157&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1086/701355

DO - 10.1086/701355

M3 - Article

VL - 127

SP - 1351

EP - 1390

JO - Journal of Political Economy

JF - Journal of Political Economy

SN - 0022-3808

IS - 3

ER -