Internal Hierarchy and Stable Coalition Structures

Massimo Morelli, In-Uck Park

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
275 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In deciding whether to join a coalition or not, an agent must consider both i) the expected power of the coalition and ii) her position in the vertical structure within the coalition. We establish the existence of a positive relationship between the degree of inequality in remuneration within coalitions and the number of coalitions to be formed endogenously in stable systems. We show that such coalitions can be mixed and balanced, rather than segregated, in terms of members' ability levels. In any stable system each coalition is of an efficient size and every agent is paid her marginal contribution.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)90-96
Number of pages7
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume96
Early online date26 Jan 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2016

Keywords

  • Stable systems
  • Abilities
  • Non-segregation
  • Cyclic partition

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Internal Hierarchy and Stable Coalition Structures'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this