Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of 'The Will to Believe'

Richard Pettigrew*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)
362 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Famously, William James held that there are two commandments that govern our epistemic life: Believe truth! Shun error! In this paper, I give a formal account of James' claim using the tools of epistemic utility theory. I begin by giving the account for categorical doxastic states-that is, full belief, full disbelief, and suspension of judgment. Then I will show how the account plays out for graded doxastic states-that is, credences. The latter part of the paper thus answers a question left open in Pettigrew (2014).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)253-268
Number of pages16
JournalEpisteme
Volume13
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2016

Structured keywords

  • Centre for Science and Philosophy

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    This is the accepted author manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Cambridge University Press at https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.44 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

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