Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of 'The Will to Believe'

Richard Pettigrew

doi:10.1017/epi.2015.44

Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of 'The Will to Believe'

Richard Pettigrew^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

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Abstract

Famously, William James held that there are two commandments that govern our epistemic life: Believe truth! Shun error! In this paper, I give a formal account of James' claim using the tools of epistemic utility theory. I begin by giving the account for categorical doxastic states-that is, full belief, full disbelief, and suspension of judgment. Then I will show how the account plays out for graded doxastic states-that is, credences. The latter part of the paper thus answers a question left open in Pettigrew (2014).

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	253-268
Number of pages	16
Journal	Episteme
Volume	13
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.44
Publication status	Published - 1 Sep 2016

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Centre for Science and Philosophy

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Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of 'The Will to Believe'

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EUT: Epistemic Utility Theory: Foundations and Applications

Professor Richard G Pettigrew

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Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of 'The Will to Believe'

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