Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions

Josh Habgood-Coote

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)
318 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions with the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)86-104
Number of pages19
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume97
Issue number1
Early online date11 Feb 2018
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 11 Feb 2018

Keywords

  • anti-intellectualism
  • intellectualism
  • know-how
  • knowledge-how
  • knowledge-wh
  • practical knowledge

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