Knowledge-how is the norm of intention

Joshua Habgood-Coote*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)
306 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

It is a widely shared intuition that there is a close connection between knowledge-how and intentional action. In this paper, I explore one aspect of this connection: the normative connection between intending to do something and knowing how to do it. I argue for a norm connecting knowledge-how and intending in a way that parallels the knowledge norms of assertion, belief, and practical reasoning, which I call the knowledge-how norm of Intention. I argue that this norm can appeal to support from arguments which parallel those for other epistemic norms, that it can deal with a number of prima facie problem cases, and that alternative conditions in a norm on intention are implausible.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1703-1727
Number of pages25
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume175
Early online date20 May 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2018

Keywords

  • Bratman
  • Epistemic norms
  • Intention
  • Knowledge-how
  • Partial plans

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