Abstract
We describe a lattice attack on the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) when used to sign many messages, $m_i$, under the assumption that a proportion of the bits of each of the associated ephemeral keys, $y_i$, can be recovered by alternative techniques.
| Translated title of the contribution | Lattice attacks on digital signature schemes |
|---|---|
| Original language | English |
| Pages (from-to) | 283 - 290 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Designs, Codes and Cryptography |
| Volume | 23 (3) |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Aug 2001 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher: SpringerOther: http://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Publications/pub_info.jsp?id=1000576
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Howgrave-Graham, N., & Smart, NP. (2001). Lattice attacks on digital signature schemes. Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 23 (3), 283 - 290. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011214926272