Lattice attacks on digital signature schemes

N Howgrave-Graham; NP Smart

doi:10.1023/A:1011214926272

Lattice attacks on digital signature schemes

N Howgrave-Graham, NP Smart

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

173 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We describe a lattice attack on the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) when used to sign many messages, $m_i$, under the assumption that a proportion of the bits of each of the associated ephemeral keys, $y_i$, can be recovered by alternative techniques.

Translated title of the contribution	Lattice attacks on digital signature schemes
Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	283 - 290
Number of pages	8
Journal	Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Volume	23 (3)
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011214926272
Publication status	Published - Aug 2001

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Publisher: Springer
Other: http://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Publications/pub_info.jsp?id=1000576

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title = "Lattice attacks on digital signature schemes",

abstract = "We describe a lattice attack on the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) when used to sign many messages, $m_i$, under the assumption that a proportion of the bits of each of the associated ephemeral keys, $y_i$, can be recovered by alternative techniques. ",

author = "N Howgrave-Graham and NP Smart",

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PY - 2001/8

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N2 - We describe a lattice attack on the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) when used to sign many messages, $m_i$, under the assumption that a proportion of the bits of each of the associated ephemeral keys, $y_i$, can be recovered by alternative techniques.

AB - We describe a lattice attack on the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) when used to sign many messages, $m_i$, under the assumption that a proportion of the bits of each of the associated ephemeral keys, $y_i$, can be recovered by alternative techniques.

U2 - 10.1023/A:1011214926272

DO - 10.1023/A:1011214926272

M3 - Article (Academic Journal)

VL - 23 (3)

SP - 283

EP - 290

JO - Designs, Codes and Cryptography

JF - Designs, Codes and Cryptography

ER -

Lattice attacks on digital signature schemes

Abstract

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