Legal Expertise and Its Subject Matter within Common Law Adjudication

John Coggon*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter in a book

Abstract

An independent judiciary is a fundamental branch of government in a liberal-democratic state. The rule of law requires expert, neutral judges to settle disagreements on the meaning of legal rules that bind and secure society, to assure that laws are applied fairly and equally, and to keep a check on power; notably the power of the other branches of government. In practice, such simply-stated theory—and seemingly obvious truth—is easily problematised, raising questions about the meanings of judicial objectivity, legal expertise, and the relationships between these and the authority of the state. Against a critical background that challenges the ideas of neutrality and the meaning and practical import of judicial expertise, this chapter examines legal adjudication within a common law system. It does so by questioning the idea of law itself; that is, it examines the coherence and rigour of the subject matter of legal expertise. The chapter’s analysis invites a broad understanding of legal expertise, and more fundamentally challenging questions about the ways we think about authority and the claims that law has to possess it.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPhilosophy, Expertise, and the Myth of Neutrality
EditorsMirko Farina, Andrea Lavazza
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherRoutledge
Chapter11
Number of pages18
Edition1st
ISBN (Electronic)9781003374480
ISBN (Print)9781032449159
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 29 Mar 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 selection and editorial matter, Mirko Farina and Andrea Lavazza; individual chapters, the contributors.

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