Abstract
An independent judiciary is a fundamental branch of government in a liberal-democratic state. The rule of law requires expert, neutral judges to settle disagreements on the meaning of legal rules that bind and secure society, to assure that laws are applied fairly and equally, and to keep a check on power; notably the power of the other branches of government. In practice, such simply-stated theory—and seemingly obvious truth—is easily problematised, raising questions about the meanings of judicial objectivity, legal expertise, and the relationships between these and the authority of the state. Against a critical background that challenges the ideas of neutrality and the meaning and practical import of judicial expertise, this chapter examines legal adjudication within a common law system. It does so by questioning the idea of law itself; that is, it examines the coherence and rigour of the subject matter of legal expertise. The chapter’s analysis invites a broad understanding of legal expertise, and more fundamentally challenging questions about the ways we think about authority and the claims that law has to possess it.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Philosophy, Expertise, and the Myth of Neutrality |
Editors | Mirko Farina, Andrea Lavazza |
Place of Publication | New York |
Publisher | Routledge |
Chapter | 11 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Edition | 1st |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781003374480 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781032449159 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 29 Mar 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2024 selection and editorial matter, Mirko Farina and Andrea Lavazza; individual chapters, the contributors.