Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints

Battal Dogan*, Serhat Dogan, Kemal Yildiz

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

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Abstract

In several matching markets, to achieve diversity, agents' priorities are allowed to vary across an institution's available seats, and the institution is let to choose agents in a lexicographic fashion based on a predetermined ordering of the seats, called a (capacity‐constrained) lexicographic choice rule. We provide a characterization of lexicographic choice rules and a characterization of deferred acceptance mechanisms that operate based on a lexicographic choice structure under variable capacity constraints. We discuss some implications for the Boston school choice system and show that our analysis can be helpful in applications to select among plausible choice rules
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Early online date16 Oct 2020
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 16 Oct 2020

Keywords

  • Choice rules
  • lexicographic choice
  • deferred acceptance
  • diversity

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