Abstract
In several matching markets, to achieve diversity, agents' priorities are allowed to vary across an institution's available seats, and the institution is let to choose agents in a lexicographic fashion based on a predetermined ordering of the seats, called a (capacity‐constrained) lexicographic choice rule. We provide a characterization of lexicographic choice rules and a characterization of deferred acceptance mechanisms that operate based on a lexicographic choice structure under variable capacity constraints. We discuss some implications for the Boston school choice system and show that our analysis can be helpful in applications to select among plausible choice rules
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 172-196 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 16 Oct 2020 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 17 Jan 2021 |
Research Groups and Themes
- ECON Microeconomic Theory
Keywords
- Choice rules
- lexicographic choice
- deferred acceptance
- diversity
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