Abstract
We present a new proposal for what to do at limits in the revision theory. The usual criterion for a limit stage is that it should agree with any definite verdicts that have been brought about before that stage. We suggest that one should not only consider definite verdicts that have been brought about but also more general properties; in fact any closed property can be considered. This more general framework is required if we move to considering revision theories for concepts that are concerned with real numbers, but also has consequences for more traditional revision theories such as the revision theory of truth.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 11-35 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Journal of Philosophical Logic |
Volume | 48 |
Early online date | 5 Sept 2018 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 15 Feb 2019 |
Research Groups and Themes
- Centre for Science and Philosophy
- FSB
Keywords
- Revision theory
- Self-reference
- Circular definitions
- Taking limits
- Probability