Limits in the Revision Theory: More Than Just Definite Verdicts

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Abstract

We present a new proposal for what to do at limits in the revision theory. The usual criterion for a limit stage is that it should agree with any definite verdicts that have been brought about before that stage. We suggest that one should not only consider definite verdicts that have been brought about but also more general properties; in fact any closed property can be considered. This more general framework is required if we move to considering revision theories for concepts that are concerned with real numbers, but also has consequences for more traditional revision theories such as the revision theory of truth.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)11-35
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
Volume48
Early online date5 Sept 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 15 Feb 2019

Research Groups and Themes

  • Centre for Science and Philosophy
  • FSB

Keywords

  • Revision theory
  • Self-reference
  • Circular definitions
  • Taking limits
  • Probability

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