Logical ignorance and logical learning

Richard G Pettigrew

doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02699-9

Logical ignorance and logical learning

Richard G Pettigrew

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

135 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Ian Hacking (1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ignorance. This includes an account of the synchronic norms that govern a logically ignorant individual at any given time, as well as an account of how we reduce our logical ignorance by learning logical facts and how we should update our credences in response to such evidence. At the end, I explain why the requirement of logical omniscience remains true of ideal agents with no computational, processing, or storage limitations.

Original language	English
Number of pages	30
Journal	Synthese
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02699-9
Publication status	Published - 5 Jun 2020

Keywords

Bayesian epistemology
Logical omniscience
Epistemology of logic
Probabilism
Conditionalization
Bayesian updating
Dutch Book arguments
Accuracy dominance arguments
Accuracy-first epistemology
Epistemic utility theory

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KW - Bayesian epistemology

KW - Logical omniscience

KW - Epistemology of logic

KW - Probabilism

KW - Conditionalization

KW - Bayesian updating

KW - Dutch Book arguments

KW - Accuracy dominance arguments

KW - Accuracy-first epistemology

KW - Epistemic utility theory

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DO - 10.1007/s11229-020-02699-9

M3 - Article (Academic Journal)

SN - 0039-7857

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

ER -

Logical ignorance and logical learning

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Keywords

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