Logical ignorance and logical learning

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

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According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Ian Hacking (1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ignorance. This includes an account of the synchronic norms that govern a logically ignorant individual at any given time, as well as an account of how we reduce our logical ignorance by learning logical facts and how we should update our credences in response to such evidence. At the end, I explain why the requirement of logical omniscience remains true of ideal agents with no computational, processing, or storage limitations.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages30
Publication statusPublished - 5 Jun 2020


  • Bayesian epistemology
  • Logical omniscience
  • Epistemology of logic
  • Probabilism
  • Conditionalization
  • Bayesian updating
  • Dutch Book arguments
  • Accuracy dominance arguments
  • Accuracy-first epistemology
  • Epistemic utility theory


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