Machine-Checked Proofs of Privacy for Electronic Voting Protocols

Véronique Cortier, Constantin Catalin Dragan, François Dupressoir, Benedikt Schmidt, Pierre-Yves Strub, Bogdan Warinschi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

7 Citations (Scopus)
445 Downloads (Pure)


We provide the first machine-checked proof of privacy-related properties (including ballot privacy) for an electronic voting protocol in the computational model. We target the popular Helios family of voting protocols, for which we identify appropriate levels of abstractions to allow the simplification and convenient reuse of proof steps across many variations of the voting scheme. The resulting framework enables machine-checked security proofs for several hundred variants of Helios and should serve as a stepping stone for the analysis of further variations of the scheme.

In addition, we highlight some of the lessons learned regarding the gap between pen-and-paper and machine-checked proofs, and report on the experience with formalizing the security of protocols at this scale.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2017 IEEE 38th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP 2017)
Subtitle of host publicationProceedings of a meeting held 22-26 May 2017, San Jose, California, USA
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)9781509055333
ISBN (Print)9781509055340
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2017

Publication series

ISSN (Print)2375-1207

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