Making things right: the true consequences of epistemic consequentialism

Richard Pettigrew

Making things right: the true consequences of epistemic consequentialism

Richard Pettigrew

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter in a book

Abstract

In his 1998 paper, ‘A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’, Jim Joyce offered a novel argument for the credal principle of Probabilism. In this paper, I consider an objection to Joyce’s argument that has been raised by Hilary Greaves (‘Epistemic Decision Theory’, Mind, 2013); and I try to answer that objection.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Epistemic Consequentialism
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Publication status	Accepted/In press - 2016

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EUT: Epistemic Utility Theory: Foundations and Applications
Pettigrew, R. G. (Principal Investigator)
1/01/13 → 1/01/17
Project: Research

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title = "Making things right: the true consequences of epistemic consequentialism",

abstract = "In his 1998 paper, {\textquoteleft}A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism{\textquoteright}, Jim Joyce offered a novel argument for the credal principle of Probabilism. In this paper, I consider an objection to Joyce{\textquoteright}s argument that has been raised by Hilary Greaves ({\textquoteleft}Epistemic Decision Theory{\textquoteright}, Mind, 2013); and I try to answer that objection.",

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year = "2016",

language = "English",

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M3 - Chapter in a book

BT - Epistemic Consequentialism

PB - Oxford University Press

ER -

Making things right: the true consequences of epistemic consequentialism

Abstract

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Projects

EUT: Epistemic Utility Theory: Foundations and Applications

Cite this