MARKOVIAN EMBEDDINGS FOR COALITIONAL BARGAINING GAMES

Lucia Cipolina-Kun

MARKOVIAN EMBEDDINGS FOR COALITIONAL BARGAINING GAMES

Research output: Contribution to conference › Conference Abstract › peer-review

Abstract

We examine the Markovian properties of coalition bargaining games, in particular,
the case where past rejected proposals cannot be repeated. We propose a Markovian embedding with filtrations to render the sates Markovian and thus, fit into the framework of stochastic games.

Original language	English
Publication status	Published - 31 May 2023
Event	International Conference on Learning Representations - Kigali Convention Center. Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda Duration: 1 May 2023 → 5 May 2023 Conference number: 11 https://iclr.cc/

Conference

Conference	International Conference on Learning Representations
Abbreviated title	ICLR
Country/Territory	Rwanda
City	Kigali
Period	1/05/23 → 5/05/23
Internet address	https://iclr.cc/

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@conference{493134cb86c24ee8bc93e94b5d7f0b43,

title = "MARKOVIAN EMBEDDINGS FOR COALITIONAL BARGAINING GAMES",

abstract = "We examine the Markovian properties of coalition bargaining games, in particular,the case where past rejected proposals cannot be repeated. We propose a Markovian embedding with filtrations to render the sates Markovian and thus, fit into the framework of stochastic games.",

author = "Lucia Cipolina-Kun",

year = "2023",

month = may,

day = "31",

language = "English",

note = "International Conference on Learning Representations , ICLR ; Conference date: 01-05-2023 Through 05-05-2023",

url = "https://iclr.cc/",

}

TY - CONF

T1 - MARKOVIAN EMBEDDINGS FOR COALITIONAL BARGAINING GAMES

AU - Cipolina-Kun, Lucia

N1 - Conference code: 11

PY - 2023/5/31

Y1 - 2023/5/31

N2 - We examine the Markovian properties of coalition bargaining games, in particular,the case where past rejected proposals cannot be repeated. We propose a Markovian embedding with filtrations to render the sates Markovian and thus, fit into the framework of stochastic games.

AB - We examine the Markovian properties of coalition bargaining games, in particular,the case where past rejected proposals cannot be repeated. We propose a Markovian embedding with filtrations to render the sates Markovian and thus, fit into the framework of stochastic games.

M3 - Conference Abstract

T2 - International Conference on Learning Representations

Y2 - 1 May 2023 through 5 May 2023

ER -

MARKOVIAN EMBEDDINGS FOR COALITIONAL BARGAINING GAMES

Abstract

Conference

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