Abstract
The literature on side-channel analysis describes numerous masking schemes designed to protect block ciphers at the implementation level. Such masking schemes typically require the computation of masked tables prior to the execution of an encryption function. In this paper we revisit an attack which directly exploits this computation in such a way as to recover all or some of the masks used. We show that securely implementing masking schemes is only possible where one has access to a significant amount of random numbers.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Fast Software Encryption 2013 |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Pages | 425-444 |
| Volume | 8424 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Springer |
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Dive into the research topics of 'Masking Tables—An Underestimated Security Risk'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Projects
- 1 Finished
-
SILENT: Rework of Side channels-theory and implications for society
Oswald, M. E. (Principal Investigator)
1/01/11 → 1/04/16
Project: Research
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