Moral and Epistemic Ambiguity in Oedipus Rex

This paper challenges the accepted interpretation of Oedipus Rex, which takes Oedipus’ ignorance
of the relevant facts to be an established matter. I argue that Oedipus’ epistemic state is ambiguous,
and that this in turn generates a moral ambiguity with respect to his actions. Because ignorance
serves as a moral excuse, my demonstration that Oedipus was not ignorant bears significantly on
the moral meaning of the play. I next propose to anchor this ambiguity in the Freudian notion of
the unconscious, by presenting an interpretation that treats Oedipus’ knowledge as unconscious. I
discuss the moral status of an agent acting from unconscious knowledge and find it to be genuinely
indeterminate, thus supporting my claim that the play is epistemically and morally ambiguous.