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On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages16
JournalNous
Early online date3 May 2019
DOIs
DateAccepted/In press - 25 Mar 2019
DateE-pub ahead of print (current) - 3 May 2019

Abstract

The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which determines the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Hedden (2013) argues that Ramsey's Thesis is wrong. He claims that Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) determines those prices, and it often disagrees with Ramsey's Thesis. I suggest two responses to Hedden's objection. First, we might be permissive: agents are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by RT, and they are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by MSEU. This allows us to give a revised version of the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism, which I call the Permissive Dutch Book Argument. Second, I suggest that even Hedden should admit that RT gives the correct answer in certain very limited cases, and I show that, together with MSEU, this very restricted version of RT gives a new pragmatic argument for Probabilism, which I call the Bookless Pragmatic Argument.

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    Rights statement: This is the accepted author manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Wiley at https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12286 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

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