On the uniqueness of optimal prices set by monopolistic sellers

Gerard J. van den Berg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper considers price determination by monopolistic sellers who know the distribution of valuations among the potential buyers. We derive a novel condition under which the optimal price set by the monopolist is unique. In many settings, this condition is easy to interpret, and it is valid for a very wide range of distributions of valuations. The results carry over to the optimal minimum price in independent private value auctions. In addition, they can be fruitfully applied in the analysis of quantity discount price policies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)482-491
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Econometrics
Volume141
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2007

Keywords

  • Auction
  • Hazard rate
  • Minimum price
  • Monopoly
  • Regularity

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