Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences

Haris Aziz, Ronald De Haan, Baharak Rastegari

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

7 Citations (Scopus)
251 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The assignment problem is one of the most wellstudied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider this problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with uncertainty leads to a number of interesting questions including the following ones. How to compute an assignment with the highest probability of being Pareto optimal? What is the complexity of computing the probability that a given assignment is Pareto optimal? Does there exist an assignment that is Pareto optimal with probability one? We consider these problems under two natural uncertainty models: (1) the lottery model in which each agent has an independent probability distribution over linear orders and (2) the joint probability model that involves a joint probability distribution over preference profiles. For both of these models, we present a number of algorithmic and complexity results highlighting the difference and similarities in the complexity of the two models.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages77-83
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241103
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017
Event26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017 - Melbourne, Australia
Duration: 19 Aug 201725 Aug 2017

Conference

Conference26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017
CountryAustralia
CityMelbourne
Period19/08/1725/08/17

Keywords

  • agent based and multi- agent systems
  • social choice theory

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