Password-based Encryption Analyzed

Martin Abadi, Bogdan Warinschi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The use of passwords in security protocols is particularly delicate because of the possibility of off-line guessing attacks. We study password-based protocols in the context of a recent line of research that aims to justify symbolic models in terms of more concrete, computational ones. We offer two models for reasoning about the concurrent use of symmetric, asymmetric, and password-based encryption in protocol messages. In each of the models we define a notion of equivalence between messages and also characterize when passwords are used securely in a message or in a set of messages. Our new definition for the computational security of password-based encryption may be of independent interest. The main results of this paper are two soundness theorems. We show that under certain (standard) assumptions about the computational implementation of the cryptographic primitives, symbolic equivalence implies computational equivalence. More importantly, we prove that symbolically secure uses of passwords are also computationally secure.
Translated title of the contributionPassword-based Encryption Analyzed
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternation Colloqium on Automata, Languages and Programming - ICALP 2005
PublisherSpringer Berlin Heidelberg
Pages664-676
Volume3580
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Bibliographical note

Other page information: 664-676
Conference Proceedings/Title of Journal: Internation Colloqium on Automata, Languages and Programming -- ICALP'05
Other identifier: 2000654

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