Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration

Paola Manzini*, Marco Mariotti

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

28 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator-who can only become active with the consent of both parties-in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. We compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options. Journal of Economic Literature classification Number: C78.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)170-195
Number of pages26
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume37
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2001

Bibliographical note

Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Arbitration
  • Bargaining
  • Outside option

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