Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration

Paola Manzini; Marco Mariotti

doi:10.1006/game.2000.0823

Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration

Paola Manzini^*
, Marco Mariotti

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

30 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator-who can only become active with the consent of both parties-in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. We compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options. Journal of Economic Literature classification Number: C78.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	170-195
Number of pages	26
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	37
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0823
Publication status	Published - 2001

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Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

Arbitration
Bargaining
Outside option

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abstract = "We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator-who can only become active with the consent of both parties-in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. We compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options. Journal of Economic Literature classification Number: C78.",

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AB - We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator-who can only become active with the consent of both parties-in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. We compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options. Journal of Economic Literature classification Number: C78.

KW - Arbitration

KW - Bargaining

KW - Outside option

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0035191357

U2 - 10.1006/game.2000.0823

DO - 10.1006/game.2000.0823

M3 - Article (Academic Journal)

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SN - 0899-8256

VL - 37

SP - 170

EP - 195

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

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Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration

Abstract

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Keywords

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