Practical Second-Order DPA Attacks for Masked Smart Card Implementations of Block Ciphers

ME Oswald, S Mangard, C Herbst, S Tillich

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

115 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this article we describe an improved concept for second order differential-power analysis (DPA) attacks on masked smart card implementations of block ciphers. Our concept allows to mount second order DPA attacks in a rather simple way: a second-order DPA attack consists of a pre-processing step and a DPA step. Therefore, our way of performing second-order DPA attacks allows to easily assess the number of traces that are needed for a successful attack. We give evidence on the effectiveness of our methodology by showing practical attacks on a masked AES smart card implementation. In these attacks we target inputs and outputs of the SubBytes operation in the first encryption round.
Translated title of the contributionPractical Second-Order DPA Attacks for Masked Smart Card Implementations of Block Ciphers
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRSA Conference 2006, Cryptographers' Track
EditorsD. Pointcheval
PublisherSpringer
Pages192 - 207
Volume3860
Publication statusPublished - 2006

Bibliographical note

Conference Organiser: RSA

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