Examines the metarepresentational (MR) status of pretense. Three theoretical approaches for and against applying the term MR to the psychological processes involved in pretense are reviewed: A. M. Leslie's (1987) pretense as MR, J. Perner's (1988, 1991) pretense as suppositional, and P. L. Harris' (1991) pretense as a precursor of simulation. The empirical evidence from 3 domains is reviewed: normal pretend play development, normal theory of mind development, and the ability of children with autism to engage in pretense. It is argued that non-MR accounts explain individual pretense and early mutual pretense adequately and parsimoniously. Attention to the diverse nature of individual and mutual pretend play and the development of a framework for a more cognitive analysis of the developmental trends in this behavior are suggested. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2005 APA, all rights reserved).
|Translated title of the contribution||Pretend play: Is it metarepresentational?|
|Pages (from-to)||445 - 468|
|Number of pages||24|
|Journal||Mind and Language|
|Publication status||Published - Dec 1994|