Principles of Takeover Regulation OUP Monograph by David Kershaw Publication Review

Georgina Tsagas

Research output: Contribution to journalBook/Film/Article review (Academic Journal)peer-review


The role that takeovers play in enhancing or destroying national wealth, and subsequently whether the regulatory framework in place should facilitate or impede takeover activity, has long been the subject of debate in academic scholarship in the field of law and economics. UK takeover regulation has been exemplified as an optimal approach to such regulation, worthy of being transplanted in other legal systems. The monograph by David Kershaw is the first of its kind to explore the effects of the UK’s system and
rules, and to offer a critique of the optimality of the UK’s system on takeover regulation, with due consideration of recent takeover events and the broader policy concerns that have been brought forward over the last decade. In addition to offering a unique, in-depth and up-to-date insight into the nature of the Takeover Panel (the Panel) and the operation of the rules of the UK City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code), the book considers the efficacy of UK takeover regulation through the prism of the unprecedented pace of change to which the regulatory system has been subject in recent times. Notably, it reflects on wider policy issues, such as the questioning of the
benefits of an open market for corporate control, short-termism in equity markets, the divergent set of incentives of shareholders empowered by UK law to vote on a control transaction, and the controversy surrounding the Panel’s transaction-focused regulatory outlook against the Government’s broader outlook considering the wider impact of takeovers.
Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Company and Commercial Law Review
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2017


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