Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation for Heap Overflow Protection

Alexandra Boldyreva; Taesoo Kim; Richard Lipton; Bogdan Warinschi

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44618-9_5

Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation for Heap Overflow Protection

Alexandra Boldyreva, Taesoo Kim, Richard Lipton, Bogdan Warinschi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

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Abstract

Memory corruption attacks may lead to complete takeover of systems. There are numerous works offering protection mechanisms for this important problem. But the security guarantees that are offered by most works are only heuristic and, furthermore, most solutions are designed for protecting the local memory. In this paper we initiate the study of provably secure remote memory attestation; we concentrate on provably detecting heap-based overflow attacks and consider the setting where we aim to protect the memory in a remote system. We present two protocols offering various efficiency and security trade-offs (but all solutions are efficient enough for practical use as our implementation shows) that detect the presence of injected malicious code or data in remotely-stored heap memory. While our solutions offer protection only against a specific class of attacks, our novel formalization of threat models is general enough to cover a
wide range of attacks and settings.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Security and Cryptography for Networks
Subtitle of host publication	10th International Conference, SCN 2016, Amalfi, Italy, August 31 – September 2, 2016, Proceedings
Editors	Vassilis Zikas, Roberto De Prisco
Publisher	Springer
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-319-44618-9
ISBN (Print)	978-3-319-44617-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44618-9_5
Publication status	Published - 30 Aug 2016
Event	10th Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks - Hotel La Bussola, Amalfi, Italy Duration: 31 Aug 2016 → 2 Sep 2016

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743

Conference

Conference	10th Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Abbreviated title	SCN 2016
Country/Territory	Italy
City	Amalfi
Period	31/08/16 → 2/09/16

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10.1007/978-3-319-44618-9_5

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Cite this

Boldyreva, A., Kim, T., Lipton, R., & Warinschi, B. (2016). Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation for Heap Overflow Protection. In V. Zikas, & R. De Prisco (Eds.), Security and Cryptography for Networks: 10th International Conference, SCN 2016, Amalfi, Italy, August 31 – September 2, 2016, Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44618-9_5

Boldyreva, Alexandra ; Kim, Taesoo ; Lipton, Richard ; Warinschi, Bogdan. / Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation for Heap Overflow Protection. Security and Cryptography for Networks: 10th International Conference, SCN 2016, Amalfi, Italy, August 31 – September 2, 2016, Proceedings. editor / Vassilis Zikas ; Roberto De Prisco. Springer, 2016. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

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abstract = "Memory corruption attacks may lead to complete takeover of systems. There are numerous works offering protection mechanisms for this important problem. But the security guarantees that are offered by most works are only heuristic and, furthermore, most solutions are designed for protecting the local memory. In this paper we initiate the study of provably secure remote memory attestation; we concentrate on provably detecting heap-based overflow attacks and consider the setting where we aim to protect the memory in a remote system. We present two protocols offering various efficiency and security trade-offs (but all solutions are efficient enough for practical use as our implementation shows) that detect the presence of injected malicious code or data in remotely-stored heap memory. While our solutions offer protection only against a specific class of attacks, our novel formalization of threat models is general enough to cover a wide range of attacks and settings.",

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Boldyreva, A, Kim, T, Lipton, R & Warinschi, B 2016, Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation for Heap Overflow Protection. in V Zikas & R De Prisco (eds), Security and Cryptography for Networks: 10th International Conference, SCN 2016, Amalfi, Italy, August 31 – September 2, 2016, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 10th Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks, Amalfi, Italy, 31/08/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44618-9_5

Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation for Heap Overflow Protection. / Boldyreva, Alexandra; Kim, Taesoo; Lipton, Richard; Warinschi, Bogdan.

Security and Cryptography for Networks: 10th International Conference, SCN 2016, Amalfi, Italy, August 31 – September 2, 2016, Proceedings. ed. / Vassilis Zikas; Roberto De Prisco. Springer, 2016. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

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T1 - Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation for Heap Overflow Protection

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N2 - Memory corruption attacks may lead to complete takeover of systems. There are numerous works offering protection mechanisms for this important problem. But the security guarantees that are offered by most works are only heuristic and, furthermore, most solutions are designed for protecting the local memory. In this paper we initiate the study of provably secure remote memory attestation; we concentrate on provably detecting heap-based overflow attacks and consider the setting where we aim to protect the memory in a remote system. We present two protocols offering various efficiency and security trade-offs (but all solutions are efficient enough for practical use as our implementation shows) that detect the presence of injected malicious code or data in remotely-stored heap memory. While our solutions offer protection only against a specific class of attacks, our novel formalization of threat models is general enough to cover a wide range of attacks and settings.

AB - Memory corruption attacks may lead to complete takeover of systems. There are numerous works offering protection mechanisms for this important problem. But the security guarantees that are offered by most works are only heuristic and, furthermore, most solutions are designed for protecting the local memory. In this paper we initiate the study of provably secure remote memory attestation; we concentrate on provably detecting heap-based overflow attacks and consider the setting where we aim to protect the memory in a remote system. We present two protocols offering various efficiency and security trade-offs (but all solutions are efficient enough for practical use as our implementation shows) that detect the presence of injected malicious code or data in remotely-stored heap memory. While our solutions offer protection only against a specific class of attacks, our novel formalization of threat models is general enough to cover a wide range of attacks and settings.

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DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-44618-9_5

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Boldyreva A, Kim T, Lipton R, Warinschi B. Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation for Heap Overflow Protection. In Zikas V, De Prisco R, editors, Security and Cryptography for Networks: 10th International Conference, SCN 2016, Amalfi, Italy, August 31 – September 2, 2016, Proceedings. Springer. 2016. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44618-9_5

Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation for Heap Overflow Protection

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