Abstract
Memory corruption attacks may lead to complete takeover of systems. There are numerous works offering protection mechanisms for this important problem. But the security guarantees that are offered by most works are only heuristic and, furthermore, most solutions are designed for protecting the local memory. In this paper we initiate the study of provably secure remote memory attestation; we concentrate on provably detecting heap-based overflow attacks and consider the setting where we aim to protect the memory in a remote system. We present two protocols offering various efficiency and security trade-offs (but all solutions are efficient enough for practical use as our implementation shows) that detect the presence of injected malicious code or data in remotely-stored heap memory. While our solutions offer protection only against a specific class of attacks, our novel formalization of threat models is general enough to cover a
wide range of attacks and settings.
wide range of attacks and settings.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Security and Cryptography for Networks |
Subtitle of host publication | 10th International Conference, SCN 2016, Amalfi, Italy, August 31 – September 2, 2016, Proceedings |
Editors | Vassilis Zikas, Roberto De Prisco |
Publisher | Springer |
ISBN (Electronic) | 978-3-319-44618-9 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-3-319-44617-2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 30 Aug 2016 |
Event | 10th Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks - Hotel La Bussola, Amalfi, Italy Duration: 31 Aug 2016 → 2 Sep 2016 |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
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Publisher | Springer |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
Conference
Conference | 10th Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks |
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Abbreviated title | SCN 2016 |
Country/Territory | Italy |
City | Amalfi |
Period | 31/08/16 → 2/09/16 |