Proving that the Mind Is Not a Machine?

Johannes Stern*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)
181 Downloads (Pure)


This piece continues the tradition of arguments by John Lucas, Roger Penrose and others to the effect that the human mind is not a machine. Kurt Gödel thought that the intensional paradoxes stand in the way of proving that the mind is not a machine. According to Gödel, a successful proof that the mind is not a machine would require a solution to the intensional paradoxes. We provide what might seem to be a partial vindication of Gödel and show that if a particular solution to the intensional paradoxes is adopted, one can indeed give an argument to the effect that the mind is not a machine.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)81-90
Number of pages10
JournalThought: A Journal of Philosophy
Issue number2
Early online date10 Apr 2018
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2018


  • Gödel's disjunction
  • Gödelian arguments against mechanism
  • incompleteness theorems
  • intensional paradox
  • mechanism
  • theories of truth


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