Abstract
This piece continues the tradition of arguments by John Lucas, Roger Penrose and others to the effect that the human mind is not a machine. Kurt Gödel thought that the intensional paradoxes stand in the way of proving that the mind is not a machine. According to Gödel, a successful proof that the mind is not a machine would require a solution to the intensional paradoxes. We provide what might seem to be a partial vindication of Gödel and show that if a particular solution to the intensional paradoxes is adopted, one can indeed give an argument to the effect that the mind is not a machine.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 81-90 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Thought: A Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 10 Apr 2018 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2018 |
Keywords
- Gödel's disjunction
- Gödelian arguments against mechanism
- incompleteness theorems
- intensional paradox
- mechanism
- theories of truth