Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare to Work

Gerard J. Van Den Berg, Bas Van Der Klaauw*, Jan C. Van Ours

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

117 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In the Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed. This article investigates the effect of such sanctions on the transition rate from welfare to work using a unique set of rich register data on welfare recipients. We find that the imposition of sanctions substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)211-241
Number of pages31
JournalJournal of Labor Economics
Volume22
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2004

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