Rational Probabilistic Incoherence? A Reply to Michael Caie

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4 Citations (Scopus)


In Michael Caie's article “Rational Probabilistic Incoherence,” Caie argues that in light of certain situations involving self-reference, it is sometimes rational to have probabilistically incoherent credences. This essay further considers his arguments. It shows that probabilism isn't to blame for the failure of rational introspection and that Caie's modified accuracy criterion conflicts with Dutch book considerations, is scoring rule dependent, and leads to the failure of rational introspection.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)393
Number of pages406
JournalPhilosophical Review
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Structured keywords

  • FSB
  • Centre for Science and Philosophy


  • probabilism
  • rational requirements
  • self-reference
  • accuracy
  • Dutch book
  • scoring rule dependence
  • introspection


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