Reasoning About Optimal Stable Matchings Under Partial Information

Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica, Robert Irving, Kevin Leyton-Brown

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

8 Citations (Scopus)
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Place of PublicationNew York, NY, USA
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Pages431-448
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)978-1-4503-2565-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Publication series

NameEC '14
PublisherACM

Keywords

  • market design, matching, optimal stable matching, partial information

Cite this

Rastegari, B., Condon, A., Immorlica, N., Irving, R., & Leyton-Brown, K. (2014). Reasoning About Optimal Stable Matchings Under Partial Information. In Proceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (pp. 431-448). (EC '14). Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602884