Reasoning About Optimal Stable Matchings Under Partial Information

Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica, Robert Irving, Kevin Leyton-Brown

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

15 Citations (Scopus)
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Place of PublicationNew York, NY, USA
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Pages431-448
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)978-1-4503-2565-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Publication series

NameEC '14
PublisherACM

Keywords

  • market design, matching, optimal stable matching, partial information

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