Reasoning About Optimal Stable Matchings Under Partial Information

Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica, Robert Irving, Kevin Leyton-Brown

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

    17 Citations (Scopus)
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
    Place of PublicationNew York, NY, USA
    PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)
    Pages431-448
    Number of pages18
    ISBN (Print)978-1-4503-2565-3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014

    Publication series

    NameEC '14
    PublisherACM

    Keywords

    • market design, matching, optimal stable matching, partial information

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