Abstract
Tariff-rate quota (TRQ) schemes are a commonly used, yet controversial trade policy instrument to regulate market access for sensitive products. In examining their regulation, the Appellate Body in European Communities’ (EC) – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) (Article 21.5 – US) held that these measures are regulated by both Articles I:1 and XIII General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since the provisions establish ‘distinct’ notions of non-discrimination. This article argues that the Appellate Body’s approach creates an unclear result based on a false distinction between Articles I:1 and XIII. Instead, World Trade Organization (WTO) jurisprudence suggests both obligations serve to create expectations of equality of competitive opportunities, even though they develop distinct approaches for achieving this end. It is proposed that, in line with the principle of judicial economy, Article XIII:5 should be interpreted as creating a carve-out from the Article I:1 Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) obligation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 411-432 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Journal of World Trade |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Publication status | Published - 3 Jun 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The author is a PhD Researcher at St Catharine’s College, University of Cambridge and has benefitted from the financial support from the Jacobson Scholarship. This article was written during a doctoral exchange at Harvard Law School. Email: [email protected]. The White House, A Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States (27 Dec. 2021), www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/27/a-proclamation-on-adjusting-imports-of-steel-into-the-united-states/ (accessed 14 Dec. 2022).
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