Abstract
We consider auctions where bidders care about the reputational effects of their bidding and argue that the amount of information disclosed at the end of the auction will influence bidding. We focus on bid disclosure rules that capture all of the realistic cases. We show that bidders distort their bidding in a way that conforms to stylized facts about takeovers/licence auctions. We rank the disclosure rules in terms of their expected revenues and find that, under certain conditions, full disclosure will not be optimal. First-price and second-price auctions with price disclosure are not revenue equivalent and we rank them.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 693-710 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | International Economic Review |
Volume | 55 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Aug 2014 |
Keywords
- 3RD-GENERATION SPECTRUM-AUCTION
- STRANGE BIDS
- BEHAVIOR
- MARKET
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Dive into the research topics of 'Reputational Bidding'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Profiles
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Professor Francesco Giovannoni
- School of Economics - Professor in Economics
- Centre for Market and Public Organisation
- Centre for Structural Econometrics
Person: Academic , Member