Retail Investors’ Trades Around Comment Letter Disclosures

Ruby Brownen‐Trinh, Joe (Joonghi) Cho*, Pawel Bilinski

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

How sophisticated are retail investors in monitoring their holdings? We answer this question by examining Robinhood investors’ trades around the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letter (CL) disclosures. We focus on CLs because, compared to periodic filings, CL disclosures are unscheduled (high search cost) and unstandardized with a significant variation in their content (high processing cost). We find that CLs attract Robinhood investors’ attention, as evidenced by a significant abnormal Google search volume index around CLs disclosure, particularly around more severe CLs. The number of Robinhood investors holding a stock reduces after a firm receives more severe CLs in anticipation of the future decline in stock prices. Our results are (i) robust to addressing the endogeneity concern; (ii) robust to controlling for concurrent information from insider sales, short‐selling activity, Twitter, press, analysts, and other concurrent CLs; and (iii) do not reflect Robinhood investors relying on heuristics in analyzing CLs’ content. Our evidence suggests that retail investors are sophisticated in processing CL disclosures as part of their portfolio monitoring activities.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages35
JournalJournal of Business Finance and Accounting
Early online date11 Mar 2025
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 11 Mar 2025

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 The Author(s). Journal of Business Finance & Accounting published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Keywords

  • Robinhood investors
  • retail investors
  • SEC comment letter

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