Rethinking Sanctions for Breaching EU Competition Law: Is Director Disqualification the Answer?

This article seeks to contribute to the debate surrounding how to reform the EU’s system of antitrust sanctions by arguing the case for the introduction of director disqualification orders, such as those currently used in the UK. Through an analysis of corporate governance theory, it will be established that there is a real need for individualised sanctions to target those who are truly responsible for the implementation of anti-competitive conduct. Directors are particularly influential in this regard, as they are often responsible for instigating an infringement or could have prevented it from taking place. After considering various political, cultural and legal factors, it will be contended that criminalisation of competition law is not, at the current stage of development, the appropriate step forward. Instead, a system of disqualification would be a more proportionate and workable solution which would combat the underlying causes of competition law breaches and have a significant deterrent effect. A specific proposal for a decentralised model of implementation is made, which would alleviate many Member State’s concerns over national procedural autonomy.