Risk, rationality and expected utility theory

Richard Pettigrew*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)

13 Citations (Scopus)
536 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

There are decision problems where the preferences that seem rational to many people cannot be accommodated within orthodox decision theory in the natural way. In response, a number of alternatives to the orthodoxy have been proposed. In this paper, I offer an argument against those alternatives and in favour of the orthodoxy. I focus on preferences that seem to encode sensitivity to risk. And I focus on the alternative to the orthodoxy proposed by Lara Buchaks risk-weighted expected utility theory. I will show that the orthodoxy can be made to accommodate all of the preferences that Buchaks theory can accommodate.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)798-826
Number of pages29
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Volume45
Issue number5-6
Early online date8 Jan 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2016

Keywords

  • accuracy
  • decision theory
  • expected utility theory
  • rational choice theory
  • Risk
  • scoring rules

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Risk, rationality and expected utility theory'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this